The well-known concept of "critical mass" focuses on the number of users as a significant factor of network growth. We argue however, that we should not only consider the size of the network, but also the heterogeneity of its elements. In order to discuss heterogeneity along several dimensions, we find Granovetter's and Schelling's models of diversity in individual preferences helpful [4] [5] . In addition to the heterogeneity of the individual users, we discuss heterogeneity related to use areas and situation, to technologies, etc. The interdependencies and possible conflicts between these dimensions are discussed, and we suggest "bootstrapping" as a concept to guide the navigation/exploitation in/of these dimensions.
Introduction
Telemedicine is expected to enable huge improvements of health care services through radically new and improved ways of collaboration and organizing within the health care sectors. Lots of prototypes have been made and demonstrated. Unfortunately, it has proved to be very hard to bring the prototypes into regular use, or at least beyond the use by very small networks of users -they do not seem to "take off." The aim of this paper is to discuss this "take off" problem -in particular strategies for overcoming it.
Telemedicine solutions may potentially be used within and across any discipline and between all kinds of organizational units in health care. Different solutions and interacting user groups will overlap. This implies that the technological solutions used by one group will have to be linked to and integrated with solutions used by others. Together this makes up a multiplicity of overlapping and interconnected networks. The overall network will, accordingly, be complex. This paper is based on the assumption that in addressing major challenges related to such large-scale networks we need to move beyond complexity and rather focus on the very nature of such networks.
Large-scale networks are not unique for health care. This means that the challenges and strategies discussed in this article are also relevant for large-scale ICT networks in general. We believe, however, that the ways these issues emerge in health care are to a large extent unique. This relates partly to the specificity of medical practices -like surgery and the way surgery interacts with other activities like radiological examinations. But we also believe that the health sector is unique due to the complexity of the technological solutions required (for instance, video conferencing technologies need to be integrated with surgical equipment as well as information systems like electronic patient records), the practices they are supporting, and the interdependencies between these.
The logic of networks
The logic of networks has been analysed within the field often called "network economics" [1] . Scholars working in this field have studied the development or evolution of various largescale and networked technologies like telecommunication and infrastructures and standards in general.
The maybe most crucial aspect of such technologies is that their value for each user increases with the total number of users that are using the technology. The value of technologies like telephones and e-mail is not primarily related to the functions they offer the users, but to the number of persons one can communicate with using the technology. As the number of users grows, the technology tends to get momentum and it starts growing through a self-reinforcing process [2] . The network continues to grow "by itself"; the more users that have adopted it, the higher the use value of the technology is, and the more new users will adopt the technology, and so on [3] .
This fact tells us that it is hard to get started building networks because no user wants to be the first one. Everybody wants to wait until -or to see if -others are adopting the technology. Accordingly, it is most rational for each individual not to adopt a technology before a significant number of others have done so. This is true for each individual. If this was the sole mechanism at work, no one would be the first to adopt the technology and the network would never be built. "Critical mass" is a concept often employed in relation to these challenges. A common strategy in line with this concept is to identify and subsidize a number of users willing to adopt the technology. If this number of users is high enough, the network will start growing by itself. But this strategy only works where there is an agent who may do this subsidizing. This seems not to be the case for telemedicine.
The critical mass model is very simple -which makes it very powerful. But in the case of telemedicine networks, we need richer models. The critical mass model assumes all elements (users and developers, organizations and institutions) are equal. Obviously they are not. Mark Granovetter [4] and Thomas Schelling [5] both point to the fact that individual preferences vary. In many cases our preferences are not static and given, but dependent upon other people's actio ns. This implies that the unfolding of various processes, like adoption of technologies, depend on how individual preferences are distributed among the members of a group or community.
To illustrate this Granovetter and Schelling describe well-known phenomena like "dying seminars" and pedestrians' behaviour when walking across a street. In the first case, a group of students or scholars agrees to start a weekly seminar on a given topic. The first meeting gathers many interested participants, the next some less, and for each seminar the number of participants decreases until the few left agree that it is better closing the whole seminar.
In the pedestrian case, we often see a number of people on the sidewalk waiting for green light. If there are no cars, after a while one person may walk on red, then a little later a second do the same, then the third one, and finally the whole flock -may be with a few exceptionsis crossing the street.
In cases like these, small changes in the distribution of preferences can have tremendous effects on the outcome. To illustrate this Granovetter [4] constructed a case: Let us assume that twenty people are waiting for green light to cross a street. Further, lets assume that among these there is one that crosses the street on red independent of any other provided there are no cars. There is also one that walk across the street if there is at least one other doing so, one that walk across if there are at least two, and so on, up to the last one which walks across if at least 19 others do so. In this case, all individuals will cross the street. However, if we make a minimal change in the individual preferences so that one of this crowd, no. x, requires that x rather than x-1 persons must cross the street before she follows herself, the process will stop at this position. x-1 people will walk, no. x doesn't walk and consequently the rest of the group will wait for green light. If this individual (no. x) is the first one, all will be waiting.
The implication of this model is that rather than "buying" (subsidising) users until critical mass is reached, one has to identify the users being willing to adopt the technology first, then those willing to adopt to it as second, and so one. But this is not as simple as it seems, since users preferences regarding technologies are not given. They depend on many factors, among them the design of the specific technologies. Accordingly, building a large network requires partly identifying user preferences and then "sorting" the users according to this, and partly shaping user preferences -in particular by the design of the technological solutions. Bootstrapping is the term we will use to denote a design process taking as its starting point the challenge of enrolling the first users and then drawing upon the existing base of users and technology as a resource to extend the network.
Bootstrapping is in Webster's dictionary defined as "to promote or develop by initiative and effort with little or no assistance, <bootstrapped herself to the top>." It may also be described as the process of making a tool by means of the tool itself. The term is used in this sense in one case that is familiar to most of us -the "booting" (or re-booting) of our computers, which is shorthand for bootstrapping. Many of us say that we are "(re-)booting" our computers rather then (re-)starting them. This term refers to the mere technical details of this process. When the computer is turned on, the software system is bootstrapped in a process which starts by the hardware reading into memory a piece of software stored in (and burnt into) a PROM and then starting this software. This software then read another piece of software starting at a fixed address on the hard disk and then starts this software. If you are booting a PC running Windows, this software will then load and start MS-DOS, which again in its turn loads and starts the Windows system. This is a bootstrapping process because the computer's software system (or OS) is loading and starting itself.
The development of the Internet is the best illustration of how large scale information infrastructures are bootstrapped [6] .
Bootstrapping is also used in other fields. In neuro-psychology, for instance, it is used to analyse and explain humans' language learning [7] . The concept captures the fact that we learn new languages largely by means of the languages we already know. And within our primary language, we learn new concepts and structures by means of the concepts and structures we already know.
Bootstrapping is crucial for the development of all networks -social as well as technical. Another illustration of the necessity and possibilities of bootstrapping social networks is Adam Michnick's successful establishment of a political opposition movement in Poland. According to Karl Weick's outline of this story [8] , "all" polish citizens found the communist regime so powerful and so determined in not allowing the existence of any political opposition, that they found it completely irrational to try to build such a movement. One exception to this rule was Adam Michnick. He was able to find a few friends who together were able to identify a space for political action that was within what the communist regime would tolerate at the same time as this space for action was large enough for achieving some results which were meaningful for those involved. And when the initial group was established and the space of action was proved to help them achieve some results, it was easier to recruit more members. And the more me mbers recruited, the larger space of action they were able to create and the more attractive it became for others to join the movement. This strategy turned out to be very successful, leading to the movement widely known as Solidarity.
Empirical cases
We will now turn to the bootstrapping of telemedicine networks. We will do this by presenting three cases having followed strategies which varies regarding their similarity to bootstrapping. We believe that their resemblance to bootstrapping to a large extent can explain their degree of success.
Broadband networks in minimal invasive surgery
The first case focuses on efforts aiming at developing telemedicine services at the Interventional Centre at Rikshospitalet in Norway. 1 The Interventional Centre was established in 1996 to do research and development on interventional radiology, image guided and minimal invasive procedures. Experiences from similar research centres indicated that one could expect lots of guests, who preferably should not enter the operating rooms. For this reason a meeting room was equipped with monitors linked to a number of cameras in the surgery theatres. Shortly after the chief physician at the hospital wanted to set up an ISDN based videoconferencing studio, and this meeting room was selected as the most appropriate location.
The co-local of the local transmission facility and the videoconferencing studio spurred thoughts of exploiting it for telemedicine. Several "virtual tours" of the centre were conducted for remote viewers. Telemedicine was viewed on one hand as a tool that could be of benefit for the communication with cooperating partners in the R&D activities. But the centre also had as its mandate to do research on different tools for medicine and acquire competence on ne w technologies. Thus telemedicine was also seen as a research object in itself. A natural starting point for such research was to focus on the feasibility of the available ISDN technology for transmission of the procedures performed locally. The image quality was considered inadequate for image-guided procedures like minimal invasive surgery, and other technological alternatives were explored.
The main partner in the early years was to be Ullevål hospital, the other large hospital in Oslo. Persons at Ullevål were involved in a regional telemedicine project, and they wanted to test out different technological alternatives before decisions were made. The project had a focus on broadband technology so as to facilitate surgery, which was seen as the most demanding application in the network in terms of demands for bandwidth, image quality, and reliability. The Swedish telecom provider Telia was trying to get a market share in Norway. Telia was one of the potential network providers for the regional broadband network and had offered Ullevål a technology demonstration. Telemedicine naturally requires both senders and receivers, and the Interventional Centre was a natural partner for this demonstration in terms of medical content (video from minimal-invasive surgery). This resulted in a trial set-up of a broadband network between the Interventional Centre and Ullevål hospital for 14 days during the summer of 1997, where the equipment and network access was provided by Telia. The tests were promising with regard to the technology's feasibility and the cooperation was continued and turned into a formal project.
When the project planning started, the focus was on enabling surgeons receiving assistance from more experienced remotely located surgeons during surgery. Quit e soon it was realized that this would be a too complex task as a first one. Before moving into this area, the technology to be used as well as extensive user experience had to be developed within less complex and critical areas. The first sub-project accordingly focused on using broadband technology for distance teaching. But the actual activities expanded outside this use area. A wide variety of transmissions were performed (meetings, demonstrations, seminars, discussions, live operations) for different g roups, and even more was planned but not executed. Part of the reason for this drifting [11] was the difficulties with summoning the intended receivers (surgeons) at given points of time, as it was difficult to coordinate the work schedules of different institutions. In order to utilise the network access and video digitising equipment fully, the scope had to be expanded.
In order to enrol partners in the telemedicine activities, the Interventional Centre offered to arrange several sessions that would demo nstrate the technical possibilities, e.g. regional seminars or lunch meetings. At one instance early in the project the large weekly staff meeting at Rikshospitalet were conducted on-line with Ullevål hospital's staff meeting, with some speakers at each site. As the two hospitals were well known for their competitive attitude towards each other, this was seen as remarkable and attracted quite a lot of attention. The session was also transmitted to a nearby hotel hosting the yearly national telemedicine conference. This was the first high profile session where the equipment and network of the project was used. The planning and support work was undertaken by the Centre's staff in cooperation with the technical consultants, and it proved to be highly valuable experience.
Other major high-profile transmissions were to Sweden's yearly medical conference (Rikstämman), and to a minimal-invasive surgery conference at the Sechenov Institute in Moscow. In addition there were several smaller transmissions. This includes a transmission for ear-nose-throat specialists where two regional meetings were coupled together, one at Ullevål and one at Rikshospitalet. There were also arranged weekly lunch lectures for radiologists, which gave experiences from novel use areas (transmission of radiological images).
The process leading up to this point can to a significant extent be seen as bootstrapping. Important elements in the strategy followed have been: avoid expensive solutions by expanding existing ones; experiment with the technology in areas where one can avoid interfering with existing practices; learn from simpler areas before moving into more complex ones; identify areas which are considered important for users (the demonstrations for large audiences were considered important by the very busy surgeons); and motivate more users through successful demonstrations.
EDI Infrastructures
Our second case is the development of EDI 2 infrastructures for health care in Norway. 3 Except from during its first phase, this activity has not followed a bootstrapping strategy.
In the beginning the focus was on simple solutions targeted for specific user groups' needs. An important event took place when a private laboratory developed a simple technological solution enabling electronic transmission of reports from the lab to General Practitioners (GPs). The lab wanted to attract more customers, and they believed that GPs would appreciate receiving reports electronically so that they could be automatically imported into their patients' medical records. The solution was cheap and simple (a terminal emulator software package operating across telephone lines), it was developed within three weeks, and it was given to the GPs for free together with modems. The solution was highly appreciated by the existing "customers," and it attracted lots of new ones. The success of this solution caused many other labs to copy it. The positive experience with these lab report transmission systems made lots of people (doctors, health care authorities, software vendors, etc.) believe that this kind of technology could be successfully utilized within a wide range of areas inside health care. This included first of all the transfer of documents having much in common with lab reports: lab orders, admission and discharge letters, orders and reports to/from other kinds of labs, various reports to social security offices, prescriptions, etc. Each of these information types involves several different institutions. Accordingly, exchanging this information electronically would require a shared and open infrastructure for the whole health care sector.
Consensus was then established about how to achieve this: by defining one coherent set of standards. The key part of these standards should be an information model, defining all information (in the different message types) in one coherent way. Separate messages should be defined as "views" into this model. The model should be developed following traditional IS methodologies, i.e. based on user requirements and modelling of the "real world." Further, the standards should be global because patients are increasingly travelling all over the world and the health care sector should be able to buy products from manufacturers all over the world (more or less) [14] . From 1990 the focus in Norway and most European countries has been on participation in the specification of shared European standards. It was taken for granted that when the standards were defined, they would diffuse and be implemented.
This was supposed to happen automatically or by mandated implementations, and accordingly the designers could apply a "design from scratch" way of thinking. This is well illustrated by the fact that it was decided that the messages should be exchanged using an underlying infrastructure based on X.400. When the first standards were specified and ready for implementation, there was in practical terms no available X.400 based infrastructure. This implied that such an infrastructure had to be built. The need to build a (complex and expensive) X.400 infrastructure increased the implementation problems significantly. In spite of the political backing of the OSI-based visions and choices, user organizations were reluctant, due to the X.400 implementations complexity, price, and lack of installed base. Many organizations had other e-mail systems which were interoperating with most others, and they had difficulties in accepting that they could not use these. Accordingly everybody was waiting to see whether the others really bought X.400.
Since 1990 huge efforts have been spent on standardization in health care. Some standards are specified, and some of them are implemented in some small and isolated networks. But, by and large, no infrastructure has been built.. The lack of progress after more than ten years of standardization work can be explained by the complexity -not to say the impossibility -of working out specifications of the information to be exchanged which satisfy the needs for the whole of Europe and the complexity and costs involved in the implementation of the specified standards. These challenges cannot be met using traditional IS methodologies, with "closed systems" thinking and specification-driven methodologies. The initial strategy followed when developing the "first generation" solutions was very successful. A continued "bootstrapping approach" beyond this initial phase might have been more successful, and could have looked like this:
• Improve and extend the existing infrastructure.
• Harmonize the local message formats into more general standards.
• Make similar infrastructures for other areas (other kinds of lab reports, then other kinds of forms) • Improve the solutions based on experience gained about how the technology can enable better and/or more efficient health care services
• Go for national standards as far as possible, and don't attempt top define global standards from scratch. When the need for information exchange across national borders emerges, set up gateways between the different information infrastructures.
Telemedicine in ambulances
Our last case is the organizational implementation of telemedicine solutions in ambulances. 4 This is a successful case -largely due to the bootstrapping strategy followed.
Østfold is the south-easternmost county in Norway, with a population of around 250 000 on an area of 3600 km 2 . Until January 1 st 1998 there were five independent public hospitals in the county, each with their own fully equipped emergency care unit. In a process of rationalization and centralization the hospitals were merged into one organization. The number of emergency care units was reduced to two, which created public concern over increased transport time and possible loss of lives in emergency situations. Also time spent within the hospital before treatment is started ("door-to-needle-time") is generally longer in large than in small hospitals. For example for myocardial infarction, treatment should preferably be given within an hour ("the golden hour"). Usually myocardial infarction is treated with thrombolytic agent s that dissolve the blood clots; however, this should not be given in certain cases as it may cause massive bleedings. The procedure was thus to wait with thrombolytic agents until the patient was brought form the ECU to the heart intensive care unit, and a doctor had verified the diagnosis of myocardial infarction using electrocardiography (ECG) equipment.
In 1996, prior to the merger, one doctor had heard of MobiMed, a telemedicine systems that facilitated transmission of text and ECGs from ambulances to a receiver (e.g. in a hospital). He and some ambulance drivers went to look at the system in use in Sweden. When approaching the county's health administration, the doctor did not manage to convince them to support this financially, but he got a permissio n to try out the system. The vendor lent the equipment, and in February 1998 two senders were installed in two ambulances and a receiver was installed in the cardiology ward in the hospital where these ambulances would bring their patients. The first aim was to transmit ECG to the cardiology ward for interpretation by a doctor. A verified diagnosis of myocardial infarction would allow the ambulance personnel to bypass the ECU (emergency care unit) and bring the patient directly to the Heart ICU.
The ambulances in this town were selected because there was here a rather high likelihood that there would be an anaesthesia nurse available for emergency trips. The anaesthesia nurses were trained in using the equipment and the practical testing started. During 1998 it was used on 166 patients, of these 16 had infarction. In these cases the ECU was bypassed and the "door-to-needle time" was reduced by between 25 and 30 minutes. The ambulance personnel were also taught how to use an ECG-recorder, and they practised on each other during quiet time periods. After some time they were also allowed to use the equipment when there were no nurses in the ambulances.
In January 1999 the ambulance nurses were allowed to administer the thrombolytic medication (i.e. giving the patient the shot) after the diagnosis was verified by the doctor on duty at the hospital, and the total time from the patient became ill to the medication was given ("call-to-needle-time") was further reduced by 25-30 minutes. Some time later the ambulance personnel were also trained and allowed to administer the medication.
Based on the success with the first two ambulances and the benefits and savings that they could demonstrate, the county's health authorities decided to support the purchase of the equipment also for ambulances from the other towns that did not have an ECU. Here the equipment was installed in April 2000, and the transition from just bypassing the ECU to also give medication in the car came about in just six months (October 2000), as compared to about one year in the first case.
During 1999 the Norwegian health authorities were approving the practice where nurses were administering the medication after a verified diagnosis. Up to that time they could do it as a task delegated by the doctor setting the diagnosis. Such an approval from the authorities was necessary to scale up the activities. Later on a similar authorization was given to the ambulance personnel and how to do it was included into their regular education.
By Dec. 2001 it was decided to purchase senders also for the rest of the ambulances, including the towns with an ECU. The aim was then not to administer medication in the ambulance, but to bypass the ECU when appropriate. Similar projects were started in several other count ies and the extension of the system for also supporting the diagnosis of brain stroke was under discussion.
Bootstrapping telemedicine networks
Based on the theoretical models and the cases presented we will now turn to a discussion of the user preferences relevant for the development, adoption, and use of telemedicine solutions. Telemedicine turns out to be more complex that the examples discussed by Granovetter and Schelling. Users' preferences in the case of telemedicine have to be arranged and shaped according to many attributes. Some are mere personal, others relate to the tasks the persons are engaged in and to their working context. Also the technology and the larger (techno-institutional) context are important. We will here discuss user preferences in terms of a number of rules of thumb that might guide telemedicine projects. 
Users' motivation and knowledge
Among medical doctors (and other personnel categories within the health care sector) the attitudes towards technology vary a lot (just like within any larger group). To succeed in the enrolment of the first users of a telemedicine network, highly motivated users need to be identified -users who believe telemedicine technology may be designed and used in ways adding important qualities to the care processes they are involved in. Later on less motivated users may be enrolled, as:
• the network grows and the use value the technology increases (e.g. more users to communicate with); • the technology is improved and making it easier for users to ove rcome barriers;
• the technology and the procedures it supports are improved due to use experience as well as the sceptics' criticism; • the sceptics become convinced about the positive contribution of the technology.
The costs of adopting a technology depend on the adopters' knowledge about it. The more knowledge about the technology, the easier it is to adopt, since the user have some idea of what it may be used for. Accordingly, the most knowledgeable users should be enrolled first. The knowledge of potential users will grow as the technology is getting closer to and used more extensively in their working environment.
Use areas and situations
Most factors determining users' willingness to adopt a technology like telemedicine infrastructures are not personal aspects of the users, but rather aspects of their work situation. We will here discuss some.
Adopting a new technology requires resources. This includes money to pay for it, or e.g. contacts to industry partners that will lend it for demonstrations and tests. In addition, to have the opportunity to experiment and learn requires time to spend on this as well as a certain level of knowledge and human resources (e.g. technical skills).
In some cases, the value of a network technology for a particular user is higher if there are few users instead of many. Some examples could be that a small network is simpler to use in an ad hoc manner as it doesn't require extensive coordination mechanisms, or that the access to limited resources is better. Accordingly, successful network building depends on identifying potential users and use areas where the productivity or quality of the work can be improved by communicating more efficiently with just a small number of users. To expand into areas where a large size is necessary, may then be a later step.
In general, the use value of broadcasting services (one-to-many) is independent of the number of users. This presupposes that an information provider is willing to invest the required resources to broadcast information even before a large number of users are connected. This is not possible if the information provider needs to fund its publishing activities through incomes from the users. If the information providers and consumers are the same, reciprocity in terms of work and benefit are required (whether it is one-to-one or many-to-many). Consequently it might be harder to make such a network start growing. One strategy is, then, to link it to an existing network and in that way draw upon the use value of that one.
Some envisioned use areas for telemedicine concerns remote assistance in acute and critical cases. In such critical situations it is most important that the persons involved can attend to the task instead of having to focus on the telemedicine technology. Accordingly, the users should start using and obtaining experience with the technology in non-critical activities and situations. A typical non-critical situation where telemedicine technology may be used is for teaching purposes (e.g. transmissions from live surgery), and meetings.
Just as there is a huge difference between critical and non-critical activities, there is a huge difference between the degree of complexity of different medical procedures. The complexity of a procedure can be "measured" in terms of the number of people, medical specialities, personnel categories and organizational units involved, as well as the duration and number of steps in the procedure, the amount of technical equipment involved, or the amount interaction and coordination required. To make a network start growing, it is best starting with the simplest practices Telemedicine may support and improve current work practices, but many of the envisioned benefits are related to its assumed potential of radically changing and improving working practices and organizational structures. The health sector is very complex, and processes aiming at radical changes and improvements will require experimental learning. Accordingly they will require time, be more expensive, and their outcome will be uncertain. Accordingly, it will probably be easier to introduce telemedicine technologies in use areas where they can support and improve existing practices. An illustration to this is that it has proved to be easier to adopt telemedicine technology in radiology than in surgery. Within radiology there are established practices of sending images to more experienced and knowledgeable radiologists for advice (second opinion), while the practice of advice in surgery is mainly based on physical co-presence in the operation room.
Aspects of technology
Whether a user wants to adopt a technology or not also depends -of course -on aspects of or related to the technology. This include issues like
• availability: the users need to have close contacts to designers and support personnel;
• simplicity: the solutions need to be especially designed to support the actual practices;
no extra functions or complexity; they need to be easy to learn and easy to use; • costs: the solutions should be cheap;
• flexibility: the solutions may be used in many different ways so that working practices may evolve and improve without changing the solution, but the solutions should also be easy to change it when necessary [6, 7] ; • "future oriented:" low risk for adopters of being trapped in a development trajectory which will prove to be a blind alley.
Coordinating institutions
The development of large scale networks requires some kind of coordinating and governance structures including some kind of standardization bodies. When the network is growing, the needs regarding coordinating institutions change. In the very beginning when the number of actors involved is small there is hardly any such need at all. This means that the governance institutions involved need to change. If existing standardization bodies are involved in the beginning, this may add unnecessary complexity to the project and may accordingly cause failure rather then success.
